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Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 19, 2016

Policy Making for the Long Term in Advanced Democracies

Abstract

A range of policy problems—from climate change to pension sustainability to skill shortages—confront governments with intertemporal dilemmas: trade-offs between maximizing social welfare in the present and taking care of the future. There is, moreover, substantial variation in the degree to which democratic governments are willing to invest in long-term social goods. Surprisingly, the literature on the politics of public policy has paid little explicit attention to timing as a dimension of policy choice, focusing almost exclusively on matters of cross-sectional distribution. This article develops a framework for explaining intertemporal policy choices in democracies by adapting findings from the literatures on distributive politics, political economy, and political behavior. The article makes a case for analyzing the politics of the long term as a struggle over how welfare should be allocated across groups and over how policy effects should be distributed through time.

Keyword(s): distributive politics, group politics, information, institutions, intertemporal policy choice, uncertainty
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2016-05-11
2024-07-03
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Policy Making for the Long Term in Advanced Democracies
Annual Review of Political Science 19, 433 (2016); https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-110813-034103
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-110813-034103
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-110813-034103
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