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Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 22, 2019

Measuring Fairness, Inequality, and Big Data: Social Choice Since Arrow

Abstract

Kenneth J. Arrow was one of the most important intellectuals of the twentieth century, and his “impossibility theorem” is arguably the starting point of modern, axiomatic social choice theory. In this review, we begin with a brief discussion of Arrow's theorem and subsequent work that extended the result. We then discuss its implications for voting and constitutional systems, including a number of seminal results—both positive and negative—that characterize what such systems can accomplish and why. We then depart from this narrow interpretation of the result to consider more varied institutional design questions such as apportionment and geographical districting. Following this, we address the theorem's implications for measurement of concepts of fundamental interest to political science such as justice and inequality. Finally, we address current work applying social choice concepts and the axiomatic method to data analysis more generally.

Keyword(s): aggregation, independence of irrelevant alternatives, justice, liberalism, Pareto, rights
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2019-05-11
2024-07-04
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