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Globalization and Social Movements

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Abstract

A growing body of scholarship acknowledges the increasing influence of global forces on social institutions and societies on multiple scales. We focus here on the role of globalization processes in shaping collective action and social movements. Three areas of global change and movements are examined: first, long-term global trends and collective action; second, research on national and local challenges to economic globalization, including backlash movements and the types of economic liberalization measures most associated with inducing oppositional movements; and third, the emergence of contemporary transnational social movements. In each of these arenas we address debates on diffusion, intervening mechanisms, and the outcomes of collective mobilization in response to global pressures.

INTRODUCTION

Globalization can be defined as a deepening international integration that encompasses information exchange, world cultural and policy diffusion, and the interdependence of trade and production, as well as how these relationships develop and unfold within nation-states (Boswell & Chase-Dunn 2000, Robinson 2014, Sassen 2007). Studies continue to accumulate on the role of global-level processes influencing social institutions and social structures. For example, economic globalization over the past three decades has conditioned both levels of income inequality and electoral outcomes across the world. This review centers on the impact of globalization on collective action and social movements. We integrate three areas of global change and movement interactions: First, we examine long-term global trends and collective action; second, research on national and local challenges to economic globalization is highlighted, including right-wing mobilization; and third, we critically evaluate scholarship on transnational social movement dynamics. In each of these sections we also consider mediating conditions, movement diffusion, and the consequences of collective mobilization in response to global pressures.

Social movements are often characterized as actions by excluded collectivities that use noninstitutional strategies and tactics in sustained campaigns for social change (Tarrow 2011). Snow & Soule (2009, p. 6) also define movements as collective actions that either challenge or defend existing structures or systems of authority. Especially when analyzing social movements in a global perspective, it is important to address several assumptions that are often made in the social movement literature. One convenient, but debatable, assumption is that social movements are an exclusively modern phenomenon that began in the context of the European Enlightenment and secular humanism, a consequence of the modernity project in sociology (Adams et al. 2005). This implies that the peasant revolts and revolutions that were legitimated in religious terms are outside the domain of the field. Recent work on revolutions recognizes that popular revolts similar to modern political upheavals were already occurring in Bronze Age Egypt (Goldstone 2014), and it is now claimed that collective behavior and rudimentary social movement–type activity are likely to have played an important role in social change since the Stone Age (Chase-Dunn 2016). In addition, religiously inspired social movements continue to be important in world politics (Denemark 2008, Moghadam 2013).

The social movement literature has also tended to emphasize that movements generally come from below, and so the collective action aspects of elite behavior have been obscured, including elites within the state. While it is true that elites generally maintain better access to institutional channels and resources than nonelites, they also often use informal modes of mobilization to influence and contend with each other and to mobilize nonelites (Auyero 2007). Additionally, scholarship has often neglected conservative, reactionary, and right-wing movements (exceptions include Blee 2017, Cunningham 2013, McVeigh 2009, Van Dyke & Meyer 2014, Van Dyke & Soule 2002), preferring to focus on the heroics of those movements that scholars support. It is our contention that a holistic understanding of contemporary world politics needs to push these conveniences aside.

Increasingly in the twenty-first century, social movement mobilization has been driven by global-level influences such as climate change, universal models of economic liberalization, and international migration. Often the global conditions are mediated by national and local environments in terms of the likelihood of the emergence of collective action and the form it takes (Silva 2013). Indeed, a substantial body of social movement scholarship focuses on the immediate local and national contexts shaping the rise of collective action, especially political opportunities, threats, resource infrastructures, and the ability to convert grievances into strong mobilizing appeals [Almeida 2003, Edwards & McCarthy 2004, McAdam 1999 (1982), Morris 1984, Snow

et al. 2014, Tarrow 2011]. Political process and political mediation models predominate within studies of social movements and largely focus on collective action within nation-states (Amenta 2006, McAdam et al. 2001, Meyer 2004, Tilly & Tarrow 2015). Comparative and historical studies employing such frameworks also demonstrate how social movements evolved in tandem with the development of the nation-state—from local and regional movements that targeted nearby authorities and elites to the emphasis of claims-making directed at national governments and parliaments becoming progressively more common by the late nineteenth century (Tilly 1993, Tilly & Wood 2012). These national structural perspectives have been especially influential in explaining the timing of the emergence of local and national movements but have been less often applied to connecting global conditions to outbreaks in collective action (Jenkins & Schock 1992, Smith & Fetner 2007).

Despite this emphasis on social movement dynamics within nation-states, there has also been a growing recognition that economic and cultural processes sweeping across the world have shaped movements. As global integration and awareness of globalization have increased, there appears to be greater synchrony and connectedness among civil society responses. These collective reactions include mobilizations related to global warming, economic austerity and the financial crisis, immigrant rights, and backlash mobilizations centering on ethnonationalism and religious fundamentalism. Recent theoretical approaches and empirical research examine the influence of global change processes over the long term and on local, national, and transnational social movements.

WAVES OF GLOBALIZATION

Long-term studies of globalization and social movements identify structural features and major shifts in the world economy and governance structures over several decades (or even centuries) and empirically link those changes to specific forms and clusters of popular contention across the world (Beck 2014, Boswell & Chase-Dunn 2000, Martin 2008). These shifts range from the absolute territorial extension of the global economy and colonial expansion to cycles of economic growth and contraction, as well as qualitative changes in the forms of capital and means of communication (Burawoy 2017, Castells 2013). Historical comparative scholars view economic integration as having occurred in several waves of globalization and deglobalization over the past 500 years (Chase-Dunn et al. 2000, Chase-Dunn & Gills 2005) with important consequences for collective action.[1]

Studies of earlier periods in which clusters of local movements broke out across world regions—so-called world revolutions—shed light on the contemporary waves of global protest by connecting global structures to the timing of collective action (Beck 2011, Goldstone 1991, Martin 2008, Mason 2013, Schaefer 2014, Silver 2003). These works examine the similarities and differences between the clusters of national and transnational social movements that occurred around symbolic years and periods of heightened struggle in world history, e.g., 1789, 1848, 1917, 1954, 1968, 1989, and 2011 (Markoff 2016, Weyland 2014). This literature emphasizes how particular global formations (Chase-Dunn 1998) create structural equivalence in multiple world regions with subsequent variations in the local forms of collective resistance. Structural equivalence and connections through hierarchical and horizontal networks act as key mechanisms and conduits for the diffusion of social movements (Erikson & Occhiuto 2017, Kolins Givan et al. 2010, McAdam & Rucht 1993, Soule 2004, Strang & Soule 1998). Goldstone (1991) provides a demographic model of state breakdown in the early modern era (1500–1800) across Europe, Asia and the Middle East,

[1]Trade globalization (global imports/global GDP) has gone through two and a half cycles since the early years of the nineteenth century (Chase-Dunn et al. 2000).

where waves of mass rebellion and revolution erupted in regions with rapid population growth, food price increases, and ossified ruling institutions unable to adjust to these combined pressures. Such historical patterns of rebellion inform scholarship on a variety contemporary movements, including those influenced by youth population bulges, global food prices, and authoritarian regimes [e.g., the 2011 Arab Spring wave of popular unrest (Costello et al. 2015)].

Polanyi's (1944) classic study of the transformation of late feudal Europe into a nascent urban-industrial society over 400 years shows how threats to community subsistence and social reproduction created counter-movements to protect vulnerable groups when disembedded from traditional sources of social welfare and protection (see also Block & Somers 2014). Piven & Cloward (1993) make similar arguments about the long-term expansion and contraction of social welfare shaping collective action. Neo-Polanyist approaches have now been applied extensively to current social movement struggles of labor and other popular movements resisting the dismantling of the welfare state under neoliberalism as a current global trend in several world regions (Burawoy 2017, Evans 2008, Silva 2009, Silver 2003, Spalding 2014).

The expansion and deepening of capitalism has occurred in the context of the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers; waves of colonization in which European powers subjugated and exploited most of Asia, the Americas, and Africa; and the waves of decolonization that extended the European system of formally sovereign states to the global periphery. The intensification of capitalist production and the increasing size of the nation-states that played the role of hegemon were driven by movements of resistance that were located both within core polities and, importantly, in the periphery and the semiperiphery (Jenkins & Schock 2004). While the geopolitical structure of the global system has always been multipolar because the core consists of a set of competing and allying states, the system as a whole varies in its degree of hierarchy because of the rise and fall of hegemons. Each of the hegemons (the Dutch in the seventeenth century, the British in the nineteenth century, and the United States in the twentieth century) were formerly semiperipheral states that rose to core status and hegemony in struggles with contending great powers. Their successes were partly based on their abilities to manage resistance from below more effectively than their competitors (Wallerstein 1984).

Boswell & Chase-Dunn (2000) identify the following ten clusters of world revolutions between 1492 and 1992: peasant revolts and the onset of the Protestant reformation (1522–1525); wars of religion throughout central Europe (1556–1581); multiple uprisings and independence movements in Europe (1640–1648); the North American, French, and Haitian revolutions, along with Latin American independence movements (1776–1820); European uprisings (1848); the fall of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and the Mexican, Chinese and Russian Revolutions (1910–1919); the Bandung Conference and decolonization movements in Asia and Africa (1944–1954); the Cuban Revolution and decolonization struggles in Africa (1959–1969); the student rebellions in China, Europe, and the United States (1964–1970); and the eastern European revolutions (1989–1992). These clusters of collective rebellion over the past 500 years were stronger in the interval periods between long-term economic stagnation and renewed rounds of economic growth. Tilly (1993) contends that disintegrating empires, interstate war, and challenges to weak states from below also contributed to revolutionary situations in this same time frame.

The idea of world revolution is a broad notion that encompasses all kinds of acts of resistance to hierarchy, regardless of whether they are coordinated, that occur relatively close to one another in time. Local rebels were not usually aware of, or connected with, one another, but they were indirectly connected through the hierarchical networks of the colonial empires and the foreign services of the hegemons. Students of mass rebellion usually conceptualize the idea of revolution as a series of events that occur within a national society in which new social forces come to state power and restructure social relations (Goldstone 2014, Goodwin 2001, Skocpol 1979). When we

use the revolution concept at the global level, many changes are required. There is no global state (yet) to take over. However, there is a global polity, a world order that has evolved in response to these clusters of rebellions. It is that world polity or world order that is the arena of contestation within which world revolutions have occurred and that world revolutions have restructured.

Arrighi et al. (1989) analyzed the world revolutions of 1848, 1917, 1968 and 1989 (see also Beck 2011). They observed that the demands put forth in a world revolution did not usually become institutionalized until a later consolidating revolt had occurred. Hence, the revolutionaries appeared to have lost in the failure of achieving their most radical demands, but enlightened conservatives who were trying to manage hegemony eventually incorporated the reforms that were earlier radical demands into a current world order to dampen resistance from below. It is essential that historical sociologists specify the similarities and the differences among the clusters of multiregion rebellions to be able to accurately assess contemporary movements driven by global-level processes. Both the contexts and the actors changed from one world revolution to the next.

Several sets of historical studies between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries connect the expansion of the global capitalist economy to the onset of groupings of social movement resistance. In the Global South, colonial expansion set off a series of revolts ranging in character from antislavery uprisings to religious and nationalist mobilizations (Bush 2008, Robinson 2000). The rapid expansion of the world economy during the so-called long eighteenth century (1750–1850) set the stage for maroonist movements, slave revolts, and messianic mobilizations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Agartan et al. 2008, Go 2011). Each movement was initially triggered by world market expansion but shaped by local contexts. In the Global North and South, scholars have attempted to demonstrate the correspondence of particular phases of Kondratieff economic cycles over the past 200 years to the aggregation of movements for peace, women's suffrage, rural struggles, national liberation, and ecology (Frank & Fuentes 1994, Wallerstein 2014).

In summary, global political economy and the world-systems perspectives emphasize long-term waves of globalization via the expanding (and at times contracting) world economy, the importance of global inequalities, and the rise and fall of hegemons. These large-scale macro processes shape the conditions for temporally grouped clusters of collective action and revolutions (Boswell & Chase-Dunn 2000, Martin 2008, Smith & Wiest 2012). With their focus on economic structures and the interdependence of nation-states, global political economy approaches highlight the material interests and motivations behind contemporary movements against free trade and privatization in the Global South (Almeida 2014, Spalding 2014, Walton & Seddon 1994) and antiausterity movements in the Global North (Ancelovici et al. 2016, della Porta 2015). These approaches also focus on the articulation of struggles across the globe via the World Social Forum process (Breckenridge-Jackson et al. 2015).[2] Such macro studies would benefit by more precisely identifying intervening mechanisms driving collective action at the local and national level within clusters of globally induced movements (Beck 2014, Lawson 2017). This includes specifying the perceived threats and disruptions of global economic expansion and classifying the available organizational infrastructures that sustain and diffuse oppositional movements (Almeida 2018).

The lasting impacts of social movements catalyzed by global change are arguably the most crucial dimension to empirically document. Long-term globalization studies stress the outcomes of the historical waves of social movement activity. These clusters of mass mobilization are thought to have changed ideological frameworks, organizational structures, and power relations on a global

[2]The founding of the World Social Forum in 2001 was a reaction to the exclusivity of the World Economic Forum held in Davos, Switzerland, since 1971. The emergence of the World Social Forum signaled the coming together of a movement of movements focused on issues of global justice and sustainability.

scale. Struggles that are only partially successful sometimes change the political discourse, introducing new ways of thinking and organizing on a world stage. Elite policies are often responses to the perceived strength of popular social movements spanning multiple countries. These may take the form of repression, but sometimes enlightened conservatives make reforms that are intended to co-opt more radical challenges from populist social movements (Boswell & Chase-Dunn 2000), including the abolition of slavery (Lawson 2017) and democratization (Markoff 2016). In an era of escalating global risks (Centeno et al. 2015), social movements provide pathways toward institutional change that address global-level problems by pressuring states, economic elites, and international bodies to consider alternative modes of action (Bair & Palpacuer 2012, Schurman & Munro 2010). In the current phase of neoliberalism, these institutional changes demanded by international movements are often transnational compacts between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private industry as free trade rules weaken the regulatory power of nation-states, especially in the organizational fields of environmental and labor standards (Bartley 2003, 2007; Lim & Tsutsui 2012).

New scholarship also acknowledges that global templates of economic development over the past century have produced corresponding forms of collective action. In the early twentieth century, much of the developing world was dominated by agricultural- and mineral-export relationships with the Global North (often colonial or neocolonial), leading to large-scale rebellions in the zones of heavy mono-crop production (Almeida 2016, Paige 1975). Between the 1940s and 1980s, the predominant model for economic growth was Keynesian state-led development (Dicken 2015). This was in reaction to the radical social movements of both the right and the left that emerged after World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II (Mann 2013). Keynesian national development and the unprecedented growth of the welfare state enabled the mobilization of large-scale urban social movements of students, teachers, public-sector employees, and industrial workers. In this epoch, social citizenship benefits expanded with the emergence and extension of a variety of forms of social welfare and a Third World Project for nations in the Global South (McMichael 2016, Prashad 2007). This same time period became a high point for social revolutions (Boswell 1989, Goodwin 2001). In his comparative study of 39 potential revolutionary situations in the twentieth century using Boolean qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), Foran (2005) found that three out of his five core causal dimensions that led to successful revolutionary movement outcomes originated in global-level relations: dependent development, a downward economic turn, and a world-system opening.

One fundamental global economic development trend of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries centers on the transition from Fordism[3] and state-led development to neoliberalism and market fundamentalism (Block & Somers 2014, Robinson 2014). The transition to neoliberalism engulfed both the Global North and South.[4] Early studies of social movement responses to the transition focused on short-term protests, strikes, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) riots (Walton & Ragin 1990, Walton & Seddon 1994). The impact of these pioneering works demonstrated that urban popular sectors were largely responding to a loss in social citizenship rights with the transition to a more market-driven economy (e.g., reductions in subsidized public goods such as health care, education, low-cost food, fuel and utility prices). In the Global South, the first wave of empirical studies found that more intensive free market reforms (or structural

[3]Fordism refers to mass production in factories. Much of factory production moved out of the old core and was replaced by flexible specialization using small-batch customized production (Dicken 2015).

[4]Chase-Dunn (2006) distinguishes between globalization as greater integration and the neoliberal globalization project (Reaganism/Thatcherism) that advocates marketization, privatization, deregulation, and attacks on the welfare state and labor unions (see also McMichael 2016).

adjustments) negotiated by the international financial institutions resulted in more civil society rebellion (Abouharb & Cingarelli 2007, Auvinen 1996, Walton & Seddon 1994). Scholarship focused on both the nature of structural adjustment agreements and neoliberal reforms (Babb 2013) and the social sectors most likely to launch collective action campaigns, such as public-sector workers, students, and working-class strata in general (Almeida 2007). Beginning in the late 1990s, scholars identified a rise in antineoliberal globalization campaigns in the Global North largely focusing on elite trade conferences and treaties such as the Group of 8 (G8), World Trade Organization (WTO), World Economic Forum, IMF/World Bank meetings, and other regional trade bodies (della Porta et al. 2006, Juris 2008, Lichbach 2003, Smith 2008, Wood 2012).

More recent scholarship analyzes the collective responses to deepening market reforms in terms of protest campaigns that are more enduring, with sets of strategies and alliances, as opposed to the earlier focus on more spontaneous IMF riots (Almeida 2014). Such campaigns usually center on a particular neoliberal policy package, such as privatization or a free trade treaty, and mobilize until the measure in question is approved or defeated (Von Bulow 2010). The Great Recession of 2008–2009 has also extended the analysis of austerity protest from the Global South to the Global North with studies of economic-based protest throughout southern and eastern Europe and North America (Beissinger & Sasse 2014, Castells 2012, della Porta 2015, Kousis 2016, Kriesi 2016). In short, the transition to neoliberalism over the past four decades represents one of the prime long-term global forces driving collective action in the contemporary world.

The World Society Perspective

A second line of inquiry on the influence of long-term global change and social movements derives from the world society or world polity school. World polity studies emphasize individuals, nation-states, and transnational organizations as the crucial normatively-constructed and empowered identities of actors in world society (Meyer 2009). In contrast to global economic change and material-based motivations for collective action, world society thinkers emphasize the diffusion of cultural norms across the globe as the catalyst for social movement mobilization. Such perspectives view nation-states and international organizations as existing in a global environment of shared values, rules, norms, and meaning systems (Drori 2008). This global moral order has increased since the mid-twentieth century with the rapid expansion of international organizations (Boli & Thomas 1999, Drori et al. 2006). International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), domestic NGOs, international governmental organizations, international social movements, and international professional bodies and conferences serve as the conveyor belts of global norms (Schofer et al. 2012). Research that tests world polity hypotheses usually focuses on changes over several decades, employing event history models with large-scale cross-national time series data.

World polity scholars have demonstrated that social movements are more likely to mobilize when domestic collective actors have ties to world society in the form of INGOs, global scientific bodies, and intergovernmental organizations (Dodson 2016, Frank et al. 2000). For example, Tsutsui (2004) finds that nation-state linkages to INGOs increase ethnic rebellion. Similar types of findings are reported for the women's movement (Paxton et al. 2006, Ramirez et al. 1997, Wotipka & Ramirez 2008), human rights movements (Tsutsui & Shin 2008, Tsutsui & Wotipka 2004), and environmentally based movements at the global level (Longhofer & Schofer 2010). While struggles may be initiated at times by local-level organizations, the world society approach emphasizes the diffusion of global norms emanating from the world polity as the primary force legitimating social movements within national boundaries and providing them with the information and templates for their campaigns. World polity studies have been particularly influential in demonstrating the global

spread of social movements in the policy arenas of human rights, health, and the environment (Hironaka 2016).

World society perspectives also offer new interpretations of revolutionary waves and other international movement dynamics. Beck (2014) provides a QCA study of 16 Middle Eastern and North African countries. He shows variation in the intensity and success of the 2011 Arab Spring mobilizations with a multidimensional analysis highlighting global embeddedness (via INGO links), subnational conditions (local incongruities with world society norms), and the role of the cross-national diffusion of effective protest tactics via emulation among countries with similar political contexts (secular authoritarianism). Sohrabi (2011) also offers a promising cultural perspective to understanding waves of revolution and their forms, focusing on how local insurgents adopt and actively interpret prevailing global-level models, such as constitutionalism and socialism, in national contexts to fit indigenous circumstances (converting them into ideoscapes). Similar constructivist insights are useful in explaining how charismatic priests, nuns, and laypersons locally implemented the universal Vatican II reform doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s to initiate mobilization over a wide array of grievances among marginalized and oppressed Catholic populations (Mackin 2015). Along these lines, Moghadam (2005) analyzes the complex incursions of transnational feminist networks challenging gender inequality and discrimination in a variety of settings in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (often supported by United Nations universalistic and modernist discourses).

NATIONAL AND LOCAL MOBILIZATIONS IN RESPONSE TO GLOBALIZATION

At the national and subnational levels, scholars are beginning to recognize that, while there are homogenizing impacts of globalization at the macro level (Centeno & Cohen 2010), such as world society scripts adopted by individual nation-states pushing in the direction of isomorphism, global intrusions within nations and localities are highly uneven (Lobao 2016, Sassen 2008) and generate different kinds of responses depending upon local conditions. The greatest body of literature on this theme comes from studies of national-level collective resistance to the family of policies related to market-driven globalization: economic austerity, structural adjustment, privatization, labor flexibility, and free trade (Roberts 2008). In both the Global North and the Global South, the level of mobilized opposition to neoliberal policies has varied across countries, within countries, and over time.

National-Level Movements

Beginning as a general trend in the 1980s, the global debt crisis led to dozens of uprisings across the developing world. The rebellions were tied to the structural adjustment policies implemented by governments in the Global South as a condition for loan rescheduling with international financial institutions (Babb 2005, 2013). Walton & Seddon (1994) have convincingly demonstrated how the third world debt crisis placed dozens of countries in similar economic circumstances, with common structural adjustment packages negotiated; up to 65 debt reschedulings took place by 1984. With most developing countries spending over a decade of structural adjustment under either IMF or World Bank conditionality (Abouharb & Cingranelli 2007), a new wave of austerity and antineoliberal protests emerged in the late 1990s and 2000s over privatization, free trade, and other economic liberalization policies (Eckstein 2002, Silva 2009). In the aftermath of the 2008–2009 Great Recession, the Global North also experienced a wave of austerity protests (Castells 2012, della Porta 2015, Kanellopoulos et al. 2017).

These economic-based protests offer an interesting challenge to extant social movement studies by their relationship to global dynamics, by negative circumstances triggering their emergence, and by the intermediary conditions of local-level contexts. The debt crisis, the institutionalization of neoliberalism, and the Great Recession all operated on a worldwide scale. Economic protests are largely generated by economic threats to current standards of living and livelihoods for middle- and lower-strata groups (Almeida 2018). Recent scholarship attempts to specify when economic threats tied to global economic liberalization will lead to national- and local-level collective action (as opposed to focusing exclusively on the positive conditions associated with political opportunities) (Caren et al. 2017). Two promising lines of research on how global economic threats are converted into national and local collective mobilization are resource infrastructures and political contexts.

In both the Global North and South, resource infrastructures are one of the most consistent predictors for national-level rebellion against free-market reforms and against the threat of a reduction in material well-being. Resource infrastructures have been defined in general and specific terms and vary across nation-states. In large cross-national studies, proxy measures are often used to capture the level of resources available for collective action such as urbanization (Walton & Ragin 1990), GDP (Abouharb & Cingranelli 2007, Auvinen 1996), and mineral/natural resource wealth (Arce & Miller 2016, Wimmer 2013). Other studies have focused on more specific resources deriving from civil society, such as labor unions, oppositional political parties, NGOs, and a wide variety of civic associations (e.g., women's groups, student organization, human rights, indigenous groups, etc.).

Spronk & Terhorst (2012) find that social movement coalitions of NGOs, labor unions, and community-based organizations are likely to emerge in campaigns against privatization in the health, electricity, and water/sewage service sectors. Other fungible resources include state infrastructures of hospitals, highways, schools, and social services that were first established in the period of state-led development and not explicitly set up to be appropriated by social movements. Health, education, state services, and highways all expanded markedly under the developmental state and provide much of the infrastructure to sustain mobilization against economic globalization policies that are perceived as unfavorable. In the neoliberal period, social movements mobilizing against economic liberalization often involve state health workers, civil servants, public school teachers, and students (especially university students), who at times use disruptive protests such as blocking highways until negotiations commence (Almeida 2014, 2015).

Another grouping of studies focuses on the political context of the countries experiencing economic liberalization and the likelihood of collective action—especially in terms of the level of democracy or political space to organize (Jenkins & Schock 2004). In a multidecade study, Hendrix & Haggard (2015) show that the economic threat of food price increases is associated with urban protests in Asia and Africa, especially under democratic and semiauthoritarian regimes versus closed and repressive states. Béjar & Moraes (2016) find that protest demonstrations across Latin America are more likely in settings of IMF structural adjustment programs and a low level of political party institutionalization. On a global scale, other studies have shown more collective opposition to economic globalization with deepening democratization at the national level (Arce & Kim 2011). All of the above studies use Polity IV data (Marshall & Jaggers 2009) to construct measures of democratization and regime type. These political context findings with cross-national time series data support scholarship on the growing role of electoral political parties in antiglobalization protests.

The democratic space and low level of institutionalization allow oppositional parties to align with social movements as a means of strengthening their electoral power by mobilizing against economic globalization (Hutter et al. 2018). Political parties act as one of the largest formal organizations available to mobilize citizens in the neoliberal period in which labor unions and rural

peasant associations have declined (Almeida 2010). This trend can be found in several world regions. In Latin America, oppositional political parties have joined in antiglobalization protests, producing large-scale mobilizations in Mexico, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay. These antineoliberal mobilizations eventuated in left-leaning electoral victories in nine Latin American countries between the late 1990s and 2010 (Levitsky & Roberts 2011), another consequence of antiglobalization social movements. In Europe, newly created oppositional parties in Spain and Greece have formed symbiotic relationships with citizen movements against austerity policies since the Great Recession (della Porta et al. 2017, Kanellopoulos et al. 2017, Ramiro & Gomez 2017). Indeed, Kousis (2016) found that between 2010 and 2013, left-wing political parties were present in 75% of large-scale economic austerity protests in Greece (those with more than 5,000 demonstrators). In Portugal in this same time period, a similar protest wave erupted over austerity and external debt, with the core oppositional infrastructure deriving from public-sector labor unions and leftist oppositional parties in alliance with so-called new new social movements of youth mobilizing largely through information and communications technologies (ICTs) (Accornero & Ramos Pinto 2015).

Globalization not only mobilizes collective action among left-leaning forces, it also creates backlash mobilization among nationalist and conservative groups (Berezin 2015). Right-wing parties and populist leaders have also used antiglobalization frames of deindustrialization, job loss, international immigration, and free trade treaties to mobilize large rallies and electoral turnout in the United States and Europe (Berezin 2009). The shrinking of middle- and working-class employment in the Global North by the dispersal of industrial activity around the globe, along with increases of immigration from the Global South, has unleashed backlash mobilization by right-wing populists, militia movements, and political parties in Europe and the United States (Robinson 2014, Standing 2011, Van Dyke & Soule 2002). The electoral participation and public discourse of rightist parties provide a protective cover for more extremist extraparliamentary protest actions (Tilly & Wood 2012)—what Koopmans & Olzak (2004, p. 202) refer to as "discursive opportunities." Mann (2004) contends that the most common feature of successful ultraright parties in Europe in the late twentieth century centers on campaigns of anti-immigrant xenophobia drawing from constituencies of the most threatened economic sectors. More recently, rightist parties now gain more than 25% of the vote in European elections (Gest 2016), while the Trump presidential campaign employed anti-international migration and antiglobalization frames effectively enough to triumph in the US elections in 2016.

County-level analysis suggests that the 2016 Trump presidential campaign overperformed in local regions with heightened levels of economic distress (Gest 2016, Monnat 2016) and rising trade exposure via greater import penetration (Autor et al. 2016). These local-level analyses of right-wing electoral behavior offer promising lines of future research on specifying the relationship between electoral support and actual social movement mobilization and counter-mobilization. The recent right-wing collective responses to globalization fit McVeigh's (2009) historical power devaluation perspective, whereby groups with previous social and economic privileges perceive or experience a decline in status and collectively mobilize around nationalism, patriotism, and racial exclusion (see also Bobo 2017).

Local-Level Collective Action

Another related research focus is subnational and local-level variations in social movement responses to economic globalization. This literature sheds light on how global change processes are interpreted at the local community level and the likelihood that collective mobilization will occur (Almeida 2012; Auyero 2001, 2006). Globalization processes unevenly affect regions within

nation-states (Sassen 2008). Auyero (2001, p. 35) refers to these dynamics as "glocalization," whereby local conditions combine with global forces. In terms of collective action, localities within states will vary in their responses to globally driven influences. Similar to scholarship on the outbreaks of national-level collective action driven by global trade and neoliberal policies, subnational- and local-level studies also emphasize economic threats, resource infrastructures, and strategic experience. Because of the local or regional level of analysis, subnational studies of globalization and social movements offer fine-grained accounts of how the mobilization processes take place on the ground versus large cross-national studies that tend to aggregate important correlates of rebellion, resulting in more abstracted depictions of key causal dimensions of antineoliberal collective action.

In one of the most thorough studies of municipal-level collective action, Trejo (2012) examines 883 indigenous municipalities in Mexico over 26 years (1975–2000). He finds that the strongest predictors of indigenous people's protests include trade liberalization/neoliberal policy shifts, local organization networks tied to the Catholic Church, and prior community experience with social movement mobilization. The Zapatista rebellion in southern Mexico that began in 1994 also offers another emblematic case of subnational resistance to globalization (as a response to the North American Free Trade Agreement). In an extensive local-level study of the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico, across 111 municipalities over ten years (1994–2003), Inclán (2008) finds that municipalities with past protest experience, more closed governments, and districts with a military presence were more likely to engage in collective action. In two of the largest sustained protest campaigns against privatization in Latin America (in Costa Rica and El Salvador), Almeida (2012) demonstrates that collective protests were more intensive in communities that had public universities, major highways, state administrative offices, NGOs, and left-leaning oppositional political parties. Similar findings have been shown for Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama in a larger study of local-level social movement responses to economic globalization in Central America (Almeida 2014).

Arce & Rice (2009) found that in Bolivia between 1995 and 2005, direct foreign investment increased the level of protest at the provincial level, with the battle over control of natural resources serving as a highly contentious issue in indigenous communities. At the height of antineoliberal protests in Bolivia in the early 2000s, in a detailed study across the country's 314 municipalities, local-level protests were associated with a larger density of NGOs (Boulding 2014). Whether NGOs are agents of mobilization or demobilization is one of the most polemical debates among scholars who study development, collective action, and globalization. As Subramaniam (2007) contends in her case studies of women's empowerment in rural India, Western NGO donors often control the agendas and priorities for collective action campaigns at the local level. Similar observations have been made about NGOs across Africa (Branch & Mampilly 2015) and south Asia (Babo 2012). Bob (2005) makes a compelling case for the relative success of local NGOs in Nigeria and southern Mexico based on their differing ability to frame community struggles in a manner that is acceptable to sponsors in the Global North. In Krishna's (2002) extensive study of 69 Indian villages in the states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, he highlights more informal networks of social capital (based on reported community solidarity) as explaining varying levels of local political participation, including protest.

In larger industrializing states such as Argentina, China, Brazil, India, Nigeria, South Africa, and South Korea, subnational opposition to privatization has been led by public-sector labor unions (Pereyra et al. 2015, Sandoval 2007, Uba 2008) and the recently unemployed, and struggles increasingly turn toward more defensive postures of preserving employment and benefits established under state-led development (Rossi 2017). Local-level protests in China have also been driven by economic reforms and associated grievances of job loss, pension arrears, and land

access (Lee 2007, Tong & Lei 2013). Community-level mobilizations have largely used the administrative state structure held over from the Mao Zedong era to register petitions (Chen 2012). Systematic studies of rural collective resistance to economic reforms in China in the twenty-first century have found that the most rebellious villages (measured by both petitions and noninstitutional protest) have been characterized by lineal family networks under the economic threat of land annexation, while successful local mobilization is associated with more formal senior associations recognized by the state (Lu & Tao 2017). In the 2010s, South Africa has also witnessed an upsurge in community-level protests over delivery and accessibility of basic social services (Paret 2017).

Arce & Mangonnet (2013) examine subnational resistance to economic liberalization in Argentina between 1993 and 2005, focusing on the protest tactic of roadblocks, a strategy that has surpassed labor strikes in contemporary Argentina and is now widely used throughout Latin America. They show that provinces with strong Peronist oppositional political parties, past collective action, and the threat of high unemployment experienced more roadblocks. Auyero (2007) also demonstrates that collective lootings in Argentina during the 2001 foreign debt crisis were more frequent in localities with strong Peronist clientelist networks.

In the context of the 2008–2009 Great Recession, scholars are examining subnational opposition to the social consequences of the global economic crisis in industrialized democracies in the Global North. For example, Vasi & Suh's (2016) study of the spread of the Occupy Wall Street movement across US cities found that many of the conditions associated with local opposition to neoliberalism in the Global South were also essential in generating movement activity in the North, including the presence of left-leaning parties, universities, and higher levels of past activism. They also found that the presence of a pro-Occupy Facebook page in a city also increased the likelihood of a local Occupy action at the community level. In another subnational study of the Occupy Wall Street movement across California cities, Curran et al. (2015) demonstrated that protest encampments were more likely to occur in towns with more votes for Democrats, a large youth population, and universities, and the encampments were negatively associated with the presence of military bases. Nearly a third of California towns and cities had Facebook pages for an Occupy encampment in the fall of 2011.

Between 2010 and 2013, during the mass mobilizations against austerity and economic adjustment in Greece, the coordination of simultaneous demonstrations and strikes across geographic space was largely explained by the local presence of labor union chapters, student groups, and leftist oppositional political parties, often in coalition with one another (Diani & Kousis 2014, Kousis 2015). It is also interesting to note how similar coalitions are molded together by economic threats (McCammon & Van Dyke 2010) in both the Global North and South in sustaining local-level campaigns during periods of globalization-induced crises.

Types of Neoliberal Policies

Given the variety of neoliberal measures, scholars currently debate which specific economic liberalization policies have been more likely to result in protests and rebellions at both the local and national levels. Baker (2009), using extensive Latin American public opinion data, finds that privatization is much less popular than free trade policies. Lindh (2015) also finds generally unfavorable attitudes toward the privatization of social services across OECD countries. Some of the largest antineoliberal protest demonstrations and general strikes across eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America have centered on the privatization of the basic social and economic infrastructure, including public health systems, social security, water administration, and electrical power distribution. In Africa, the global turn to market deregulation has resulted in the largest mobilizations centering on the costs of food, transportation, fuel, and the general loss of social services (Branch

& Mampilly 2015, Sneyd et al. 2013). In early 2012, Nigeria experienced one of the largest mass mobilizations in decades over an IMF-advised policy cutting fuel subsidies. Occurring at the same time of the US protests, the movement was coined Occupy Nigeria (Branch & Mampilly 2015). Mexico experienced similar nation-wide protests over fuel subsidy cuts in early 2017 in a campaign called the *gasolinazo*.

Free trade policies and treaties have proliferated since the establishment of the WTO in 1995 (Dicken 2015) and have consequently sparked massive protest campaigns in Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Ecuador, El Salvador, Canada, Costa Rica, Colombia, France, Guatemala, Italy, Peru, the United States, and South Korea; they also served as the initial impetus to the 1994 Zapatista rebellion in southern Mexico. Moreover, one of the most successful transnational protest campaigns in contemporary Latin America involved the effective coordination of labor unions and leftist political parties across South America to defeat the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Herkenrath 2010, Silva 2013, von Bulow 2010). Other cross-national comparative work has demonstrated that the timing of economic liberalization matters for mobilization potential and movement strategy. Civil society is more likely to coordinate protest campaigns after several rounds of negative policy experiences with neoliberalism, and it tends to develop more efficacious mobilizing strategies in the wake of past oppositional defeats (Almeida 2014). Recent studies of collective resistance to market-driven globalization have also moved beyond resource infrastructure and political context explanations to focus on the moral meanings of economic reforms for local populations using ethnographic research strategies (Auyero 2006, Hall et al. 2015, Simmons 2016).

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Transnational social movements have become conventionally defined as movements operating in at least two countries (della Porta & Kriesi 2009, Tarrow 2006). Hence, there exists wide variation in the global reach of transnational movements, from two countries to nearly all nations on the planet (in the case of climate justice). Even though rudimentary transnational movements have existed for centuries, deepening globalization in the late twentieth century has produced a steep rise in the number of transnational movement campaigns. The past three decades alone have witnessed a near tripling in the number of transnational social movement organizations (Smith & Wiest 2012). Transnational collective action also represents a diversity of types of movements, from international terrorist networks to nonviolent campaigns to end child labor exploitation, human sex trafficking, and sweatshop labor in export processing zones (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). The infrastructure undergirding the new transnational activism centers on the expansion of ICT networks and international organizational connections.

One fundamental property of globalization in relation to transnational social movements is the double-edged nature of its social consequences as it deepens. On one side, the new ICTs associated with internationalization have facilitated a greater density of social movement ties among activists and issue advocacy organizations across the globe (Bennett & Segerberg 2013, della Porta & Tarrow 2005, Smith 2008). On the other side, global capital intensifies collective grievances across national boundaries on a variety of issues from labor and human rights to environmental destruction. These twin processes will likely sustain transnational movements and conflicts well into the future, as market-driven globalization accounts for the motivational grievances of some of the largest and most dramatic intercontinental mobilizations, such as the campaigns for global economic justice and against global warming and climate change.

Students of transnational movements recognize that the predecessors of contemporary transnational movements emerged in the nineteenth century, namely the international labor movement, the women's suffrage movement, and the struggles for the abolition of slavery (Keck &

Sikkink 1998, Markoff 2016). The transnational diffusion of clusters of successful social movements (achieving desired outcomes) has also been associated with the emergence of large civil society organizations over the past 200 years, such as mass political parties and labor associations (Weyland 2014), providing the organizational infrastructure for earlier transnational movements as well as offering insights into the informational channels of current global movements. Indeed, in survey data of transnational activists participating in the 2005 and 2007 World Social Forums in Brazil and Kenya (one of the largest international movement networks), between 40% and 56% of participants were affiliated with an NGO, while up to 20% were a member of either a political party or a labor union (Reese et al. 2015, Smith et al. 2014). Della Porta et al. (2006) find similar levels of organizational affiliation among transnational activists participating in the European Social Forum.

Many scholars of transnational social movements in the twenty-first century have focused on the global economic justice movement, the climate change movement, the World Social Forum, and international feminism (Evans 2005, Moghadam 2005). These studies address how the movements have sought to overcome the collective action problems of coordinating activities across multiple national territories and languages. Transnational movement research addresses how the network ties made possible by global communications have greatly expanded the potential reach for transnational movement mobilization—what Tarrow & McAdam (2005) refer to as scale shift. Key activist websites assembled by the Independent Media Center, People's Global Action, Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens, Avaaz, and 350.org (as well as movement-specific Facebook sites and free international messaging applications such as Skype, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Telegram) serve a broker role for global civil society by connecting organizations and individuals that would otherwise not be linked (della Porta et al. 2006, Horstink 2017, Juris 2005). These websites and digital messaging applications offer logistical information in multiple languages for coordinating local events as essential components of larger transnational campaigns (Almeida & Lichbach 2003, Howard 2010). Web-initiated activism has been found to be most successful (in terms of producing large-scale and ongoing mobilization) when coordinated with preexisting NGOs and civil society associations, as opposed to exclusively recruiting and targeting unaffiliated individuals or the general public (Lewis et al. 2014, Van Laer 2010).

While transnational movements emerged in the 1980s over issues such as nuclear disarmament, ending South African apartheid, and achieving peace in Central America, a notable uptick in activity took place in the 1990s. By the late 1990s, the global economic justice movement alone coordinated simultaneous collective action events in dozens of countries on an annual basis. Transnational activism sustained momentum as global economic meetings became the focus for a variety of social movements (Lichbach 2003, Lichbach & de Vries 2007). G8, G20, the World Economic Forum, the WTO, and many regional economic trade bodies (e.g., CAFTA, NAFTA, FTAA, EU, APEC, ASEAN, TPP) served as targets for oppositional groups to deliver their demands (Wood 2012). Global justice activists innovated by using the communications technologies emerging in the late 1990s—email, mobile phones, websites, and rapid language translation—to coordinate simultaneous protest events across cities on multiple continents for each major economic summit. Castells (2013) views the new social media and digital resources as a major turning point in power relations in the twenty-first century, with subaltern groups attaining an unprecedented capacity to employ self-communication for the purposes of mass mobilization. For the developing world, Howard (2010) documents a tremendous growth in access to ICTs as well as a substantial reduction in their costs for average citizens in the first decade of the new millennium.

One early high point of international movement coordination in North America that has received much scholarly attention was the 1999 WTO Third Ministerial meetings in Seattle, Washington, where activists mobilized one of the largest demonstrations in the United States

in several decades (Smith 2001). Transnational activists organized concurrent demonstrations in Seattle, dozens of US cities, and at least 90 countries around the world (Almeida & Lichbach 2003). Hence, with the Seattle WTO meetings, transnational activists effectively consolidated an organizing model used in subsequent major international movement campaigns—a massive series of demonstrations at the main focal event along with dozens (if not hundreds, or even thousands, in some cases) of solidarity protests dispersed across several continents. Over the next two decades, transnational movements coordinated simultaneous actions internationally along similar lines for other global trade forums, the anti-Iraq war movement, and, most recently, climate justice. This particular organizational template has produced arguably the largest mobilizations in world history, including the February 15, 2003, anti-Iraq invasion mobilizations (Walgrave & Rucht 2010) and the 2014 and 2015 global mobilizations to reduce global warming and carbon emissions.

Based on research using surveys of protest participants and analysis of protest events, these transnational movements are not just engaging in emulation in terms of campaign strategies, but they also have spilled over (Meyer & Whittier 1994) into one another via the overlap in participants and organizations across international mobilizations related to global economic justice, antiwar efforts, and climate change (Fisher 2006, Hadden 2014). In addition, scholars of transnational movements increasingly employ the techniques the activists use to mobilize. Such data collection strategies include extracting protest event and other data from Twitter and Facebook feeds and other methods of web scraping from activist internet sites. Current scholarship would benefit from more incorporation of social media variables in globalization-induced protest research and the use of web science (e.g., Earl & Kimport 2011) in all world regions.

An emerging area of scholarly concern centers on right-wing transnational mobilization, in which globally organized conservative NGO networks and think-tanks serve as ideological and policy counter-movements to a wide array of issues ranging from gun control and antifeminism to dismantling environmental protections and social security (Blee & McGee Deutsch 2012, Bob 2012, Orenstein 2008, Spalding 2014). Other scholars are comparing the right-wing populist and neofascist movements that have emerged in response to globalization with the earlier wave of fascist sects, populist movements, and regimes that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century (Chase-Dunn & Dudley 2018, Judis 2016, Mann 2004, Paxton 2004).

CONCLUSION

Social movements and collective behavior have long been important spurs to social change, and as human societies have become larger and more connected with one another, social movements have surfaced on a global scale: They are caused by global processes and contribute to the evolution of global institutions and global culture. Global social change has been, and remains, a contentious process in which local, national, and transnational groups of people cooperate, compete and conflict with one another. Local and national movements have varied in their response to globalization processes based on resource infrastructures, political contexts, and their ability to translate world society templates to indigenous institutions. Compared to left-leaning movements, we know much less about rightist and backlash mobilization at the local and national levels. Transnational movements will likely continue to grow in strength as the century progresses, given the growing density of organizational and communication linkages. Movements such as climate justice play an increasingly vital role by using the tools of the digital era to gain attention and pressure national and international policy-makers in campaigns of planetary mobilization. These developments offer fertile ground for movement scholarship to develop and employ novel data collection techniques from the abundance of new social media data generated by activists. The twenty-first century promises to be a continuation of these processes, but hopefully enough has

been learned by humanity to avoid the destruction and disasters that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century.

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