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Nationalism in Settled Times

Bart Bonikowski

Department of Sociology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138;
email: bonikowski@fas.harvard.edu

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Abstract

Due to a preoccupation with periods of large-scale social change, nationalism research had long neglected everyday nationhood in contemporary democracies. Recent scholarship, however, has begun to shift the focus of this scholarly field toward the study of nationalism not only as a political project but also as a cognitive, affective, and discursive category deployed in daily practice. Integrating insights from work on banal and everyday nationalism, collective rituals, national identity, and commemorative struggles with survey-based findings from political psychology, I demonstrate that meanings attached to the nation vary within and across populations as well as over time, with important implications for microinteraction and for political beliefs and behavior, including support for exclusionary policies and authoritarian politics. I conclude by suggesting how new developments in methods of data collection and analysis can inform future research on this topic.

INTRODUCTION

The mid 2010s have witnessed a resurgence of nationalist discourse in the United States, mirroring longer-term trends in the European public sphere. Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have articulated visions of their nations under siege—by immigrants, refugees, domestic minority populations, and these groups' ostensible accomplices among the political and cultural elites. Evoking nostalgia for the nation's bygone glory days, these diagnoses have been coupled with sundry policy proposals aimed at making the country great again, to paraphrase Donald Trump's campaign slogan: from the tightening of national borders, increased surveillance of national populations, and scaling back of supranational integration to an ill-fitting mix of foreign policy isolationism and hawkish calls for unilateral projection of military power abroad. Narratives of the nation's putative failings have resonated with beliefs deeply held by large segments of the voting public, laying bare cultural cleavages that are likely to shape election outcomes, policy decisions, and social movement mobilization.

Although by no means novel (Berezin 2009, Gerstle 2001, Smith 1997), these developments make clear that nationalism—understood as a pervasive cognitive and affective orientation rather than a coherent ideology—continues to animate everyday politics in contemporary democracies. Yet, until recently, sociologists of nationalism have had surprisingly little to say about lay understandings of the nation. Instead, most nationalism research had long been preoccupied with exceptional moments of social transformation, such as the rise of the modern nation-state and more recent efforts by nationalist movements to realign existing state boundaries. The contributions of this work have been notable, but its emphasis on elite-driven historical change has largely neglected nationalism in established nation-states (Calhoun 1997, p. 2).

Building on past programmatic statements by leading theorists in the field (Billig 1995; Brubaker 1996, 2004a; Calhoun 1997), I propose to redirect scholarly attention toward nationalism in contemporary democracies, among everyday people rather than elites, and in settled times rather than in periods of fundamental social upheaval. To do so, I draw on five research traditions that have considered the nation as a politically relevant cultural construct: (a) studies that examine how and when the nation is employed in routine interaction; (b) work on the role of public rituals in heightening and reinvigorating national attachments; (c) analyses of national identity that seek to identify the dominant representations of the nation in political culture; (d) scholarship on collective memory that explores symbolic struggles over the nation's contested meaning; and (e) survey research that makes distributional claims about respondents' attitudes toward the nation. Whereas each approach has considerable limitations, their synthesis presents opportunities for innovative research on this important topic.

What might a research program built on such a foundation look like? First, it should consider nationalism from the bottom up, as a set of intersubjective meanings and affective orientations that give people a sense of self and guide their social interactions and political choices. Such a shift would imply not only a focus on popular beliefs and attitudes, but also the understanding that nationhood is only one source of identity, whose salience depends on a variety of contextual factors.

Second, such research should explicitly consider the heterogeneity of vernacular conceptions of the nation within any given polity. The nation is not a static cultural object with a single shared meaning, but a site of active political contestation between cultural communities with strikingly different belief systems. Such conflicts are at the heart of contemporary political debates in the United States and Europe.

Finally, as is explicit in the title of this article, research on nationalism should examine the phenomenon during settled times and not just moments of fundamental institutional crisis—that is, in stable, modern democracies rather than in newly formed states, regions with separatist

proclivities, or unstable political regimes. Although nationalism may crystallize, and thus become more readily observable, in the aftermath of exogenous shocks to the nation or during protracted conflicts in the public sphere, such periods of heightened national self-awareness bring to the surface latent tensions that preexist and succeed them. Thus, for the purposes of this article, “settled times” should be understood in relative terms, as periods when disruptions of varying magnitude do arise but are absorbed by existing institutions instead of generating widespread social and political transformations.

All three objectives require scholars’ engagement with meanings held by individuals embedded in concrete social environments. If the nation is not just a political entity but also a cognitive frame through which people apprehend social reality and construct routinized strategies of action, research on nationalism must incorporate insights from cultural sociology and social psychology about how meanings structured by institutions shape social interaction and group relations. This suggests a research strategy that views dispositions toward the nation as relational, intersubjective, morally and affectively laden, and largely taken for granted. The resulting empirical investigations are likely to require an adaptation of existing research methods and the exploitation of new sources of data. Fortunately, the constitutive elements of this research agenda already exist; what is needed is their integration across disciplinary and methodological boundaries.

Before surveying the relevant scholarship, it is important to clarify how nationalism should be conceptualized in the context of this review. In particular, I hope to unsettle the identification of nationalism with specific ideologies and instead advocate for its understanding as a heterogeneous cultural domain consisting of tacit cognitive and affective dispositions, routinized forms of talk, and ritualized symbolic practices.

BEYOND NATIONALISM AS IDEOLOGY

Dominant scholarly approaches to nationalism can be classified along two dimensions, illustrated in **Table 1**: political versus quotidian (i.e., focusing on elite political projects or on the beliefs of everyday people) and ideology versus practice (i.e., treating nationalism as a coherent set of principles or as a heterogeneous domain of social and political life). Research on nationalism as an elite ideology (top-left cell of **Table 1**) has focused on modern nation-state formation (Anderson 1983), the subsequent diffusion of the nation-state form (Wimmer & Feinstein 2010), and separatist movements that seek to reconfigure the boundaries of existing states (Hechter 2000). This scholarship typically defines nationalism as “a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983, p. 1). Central debates in this field concern the causes of the emergence of nation-states (e.g., print capitalism, colonial governance, industrialization) and the historical status of nations as either modern creations of centralizing states or successors to preexisting ethnic groups (Calhoun 1997). From this vantage point, nationalism has largely fulfilled its promise and is thus primarily a matter for historical research—except in cases where existing institutional configurations are actively contested.

Nationalist ideology, however, is not solely the domain of political elites seeking to legitimize their rule over a territorially bounded people. For political psychologists, nationalism is a set of dispositions that cohere at the level of individual actors (top-right cell of **Table 1**). Thus, for instance, Kosterman & Feshbach (1989, p. 271) define nationalism as “a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance”—that is, chauvinism. Here, the congruence of the nation and the state is not in question; the nation-state is not only legitimate but is exalted above all others. Analytically, nationalism is understood by this tradition as a set of attitudes that shape the perceptions and behaviors of ordinary people as they come into contact

Table 1 Conceptions of nationalism

	Political (focus on elites' political projects and discursive practices)	Quotidian (focus on lived culture, ideas, and sentiments of non-elites)
Ideology ("nationalism" refers to narrow set of ideas)	Gellner (1983, p. 1): "a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent"	Kosterman & Feshbach (1989, p. 271): "a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance"
Practice ("nationalism" refers to a domain of meaningful social practice)	Brubaker (2004b, p. 116): "a claim on people's loyalty, on their attention, on their solidarity [...] used [...] to change the way people see themselves, to mobilize loyalties, kindle energies, and articulate demands"	Brubaker (1996, p. 10): "a heterogeneous set of 'nation'-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or 'endemic' in modern cultural and political life"

with political institutions (e.g., by voting) and engage in social interaction (e.g., with immigrants or ethnic minorities).

Political psychologists tend to view nationalism (i.e., chauvinism) as a normative problem, owing to its associations with anti-immigrant attitudes and bellicose foreign policy preferences. Potentially invidious dispositions toward the nation, however, are not limited to chauvinism; they also include exclusionary conceptions of national membership, excessive forms of national pride, and strong identification with the nation above all other communities. Furthermore, the standard distinction in this literature between nationalism and its ostensibly benign counterpart, patriotism, is fraught with analytical difficulty. It is unclear if the difference between "a deeply felt attachment to the nation," as Conover & Feldman (1987) define patriotism, and a "perception of national superiority" (Kosterman & Feshbach 1989) is one of degree or kind. The slippage between these terms is not lost on scholars of patriotism, who are forced to come up with further distinctions when their central concept turns out not to be as value-neutral as assumed (Schatz et al. 1999). These problems illustrate the limitations of identifying nationalism with a single ideology; nationalism is multidimensional and its conceptualization should be guided by analytical clarity, not normative convictions. As Calhoun has argued (1997, p. 3), "[b]oth positive and negative manifestations of national identity and loyalty are shaped by the common discourse of nationalism."

The two ideologically oriented research traditions subscribe to the view that nationalism defines the ends of action: For elite actors espousing nationalism as a political ideology, the goal is to achieve political sovereignty on behalf of (or over) a national community; for people who experience strong feelings of national superiority, the preferred outcomes are domination over other nations and the policing of the nation's symbolic boundaries (Lamont & Molnar 2002) against undesirable others. An alternative way of thinking about nationalism, however, is to treat it as the means rather than the ends of action (Swidler 1986). Nationalism is not only a conscious ideology, it is also a discursive and cognitive frame through which people understand the world, navigate social interactions, engage in coordinated action, and make political claims. The latter orientation is exemplified by the two research approaches in the bottom cells of **Table 1**, which view nationalism as a domain of meaningful social practice.

If the operative mode of nationalism-as-ideology is to effect political change in the interest of national sovereignty, nationalism-as-practice involves people thinking, talking, and acting through and with the nation (Brubaker 2004a, Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008, Goode & Stroup 2015). The latter research approach does not begin with a priori assumptions about the content of nationalist ideas, but rather treats nationalism as a domain of social life (and of scholarly inquiry) that is defined by a taken-for-granted belief in the natural status of the nation-state as an object of identification and

a mode of social and political organization. The goal then is to investigate the range of meanings with which people imbue the nation, examine the relationship between national and other forms of identification, uncover the mechanisms that reproduce the unquestioned cultural and political dominance of the nation-state, and observe the manner in which the nation is evoked in everyday practice. The central units of analysis in this tradition are not ideologies but collective narratives, political claims, symbolic representations, and cultural schemas.

Research on nationalism as a domain takes two forms. The first (bottom-left cell of **Table 1**) treats nationalism as a mode of political discourse articulated in the public sphere (Brubaker 2004b). The focus here is on the manner in which elites formulate political claims by evoking meanings of the nation that resonate with salient public narratives (Snow & Benford 1988, Tilly 2002). Research on nationalism in everyday life (bottom-right cell of **Table 1**), on the other hand, examines how the nation is understood and deployed in routine interactions (Brubaker 1996, 2004a). This may manifest itself through explicit references to the nation, but just as often, nationalism's influence is more tacit, expressed in habituated modes of thought, speech, and behavior that take for granted the nation's cultural and political primacy.

The fourfold classification of the conceptual approaches to nationalism research suggests some common themes. If we understand nationalism to consist of cognitive and discursive practices that enact and perpetuate a common-sense understanding of the nation-state as a natural cultural and political entity, then we can ask how such practices came to be taken for granted in the first place (as do scholars of nation-building) and how and when they are evoked in political claims-making and to what ends (as do scholars of political discourse). We can also seek to understand under what circumstances tacit understandings of the nation crystallize into self-conscious ideologies, and how those ideologies in turn shape the cultural practices of the members of national communities (as well as those who are excluded from legitimate national membership). To answer these questions, one would need to take into account the contextual factors that reproduce and sometimes transform nationalism, from organizational and institutional practices to symbolic rituals and structured microinteractions (Skey 2011).

In this article, I review sociological research on nationalism as a meaningful category of practice and political psychology scholarship on nationalist attitudes (the two cells in the second column of **Table 1**); among their other consequences, such practices and beliefs are likely to shape the conditions of possibility for political mobilization through nationalist discourse (the bottom-left cell). Thus far, these literatures have proceeded largely independently of one another, despite sharing a common object of analysis. Greater synthesis of their respective contributions is necessary for the development of a more complete understanding of nationalism's role in everyday life. To that end, the reader is encouraged to treat nationalism as a general social, cultural, and political domain, which can include the invidious beliefs studied by political psychologists but is not limited to them. Such an approach leaves analytical room for a range of research approaches, regardless of how they define their object of study.

THE NATION IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE

The first step in furthering a research agenda on contemporary nationalism is to establish the salience of the nation in everyday life. That people routinely perceive the world through a national lens is a necessary prerequisite for any claims about the impact of competing visions of the nation on social interaction and politics.

National identification is most tractable when the meaning of the nation becomes an object of symbolic struggle (as in research on commemoration), when national membership is reinscribed through collective ritual (as in research on festivals and holidays), and when nationhood-as-usual

is punctuated by unexpected events (as in studies of terrorist attacks or natural disasters) (Brubaker 1996). While such moments of relative unsettlement represent deviations from routine practice, they are analytically useful, much like breaching experiments in ethnomethodology, for bringing into relief otherwise latent cultural processes (Swidler 1986). Even outside of such episodes, however, scholars have been able to examine people's national dispositions by analyzing routine symbolic practices, by observing the use of national frames in interaction, and by directly eliciting responses in interviews, focus groups, and surveys.

This research has demonstrated that routine evocations of the nation in settled times are essential for the continual reproduction of the national community. Indeed, as Renan [1882 (1996), p. 42] has stressed, if the nation is fundamentally based on "consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life," then the nation's continued existence is "a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life." This plebiscite is tacit and its outcome for the most part predetermined, but this is so precisely because of the myriad ways in which the nation is actively institutionalized in daily practice.

It is this process of institutionalization that is the focus of work on banal nationalism (as opposed to more incendiary or "hot" nationalism), a term coined and theorized by Michael Billig. Billig (1995, p. 6) argues that "daily, the nation is indicated, or 'flagged,' in the lives of its citizenry" through exposure to implicit cues. These subtle reminders reinforce prior socialization into the nation through mass education and collective rituals associated with national holidays and crises (Collins 2012, Skey 2006). Thus, "nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition" (Billig 1995, p. 6), based on the naturalized beliefs that "the world is (and should be) divided into identifiable nations, that each person should belong to a nation, that an individual's nationality has some influence on how they think and behave and also leads to certain responsibilities and entitlements" (Skey 2011, p. 5).

Research related to banal nationalism has taken two forms. The first holds analytically constant the importance of the nation in everyday life and asks how this common-sense belief system is reproduced. The second, in contrast, challenges the idea that the nation is relevant to all people at all times and instead asks under what circumstances national frames of reference are employed in daily practice.

To answer the first question, scholars have studied the public culture within which contemporary life unfolds in established nation-states. Wodak et al. (1999), for instance, focus on the importance of political and commemorative speeches and debates in perpetuating national habitus (Bourdieu 1990). These forms of public talk emphasize the internal homogeneity of the nation and its fundamental distinctiveness from other national communities, thereby bringing people's personal identity narratives in line with those of the nation-state. Edensor (2002) highlights the importance of geographic space in perpetuating national frames of reference, in the sense of both an administratively bounded territory and a familiar, affectively infused landscape. Others have examined the role of the concurrent consumption of media content across geographically disparate regions of a given nation (Anderson 1983, Rahn 2000), the prominence of national figures in street-naming practices (Centeno 2003), the role of museums in curating national culture (Levitt 2015), the institutionalization of cultural rituals that index the nation (Surak 2011), the branding of nations through large-scale architectural projects (McNeill & Tewdwr-Jones 2003), and patriotic flag display practices (Köse & Yılmaz 2012), particularly in the wake of national tragedies (Skitka 2005).

Symbolic reminders of the nation's primacy are also shaped by state institutions that systematically survey, classify, and reconfigure the social and physical world in distinctly national ways (Scott 1999). By defining national populations through censuses and citizenship laws (Anderson 1983, Brubaker 1992, Herzog 2015), institutionalizing national territory through administrative map making (Winichakul 1997), producing national history through standardized school

curricula (Moreau 2003), and marketing cultural heritage in national terms (Aronczyk 2013, Bandelj & Wherry 2011, DeSoucey 2010), the state continually reasserts the primacy of the national community in its citizens' thinking and behavior. No less important is the formal exclusion of those judged not to hold the appropriate traits or credentials for national membership (Koopmans et al. 2005, Smith 1997, Wimmer 2002).

Evidence that the nation is a deeply internalized and embodied (Surak 2012) category of practice suggests that people are likely to make choices and enact routinized scripts of action based on their sense of national belonging. Yet, the nation is only one of many sources of individual identification, alongside other collective and role-based identities (Díez Medrano & Gutiérrez 2001, Smith-Lovin 2007). Thus, in addition to studying how the nation becomes taken for granted, the challenge is to find out when and where it becomes practically important (Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008).

Some promising leads are offered by Fox & Miller-Idriss (2008), who argue that nationalism-as-practice informs everyday life in four ways: through talk (both about and with the nation), symbolic rituals, engagement with national institutions, and consumption practices. Of these, nationalist talk has received the most attention in sociological research. An exemplar of this approach, Brubaker et al.'s (2007) extensive mixed-methods study of Cluj, a Transylvanian town, sought to identify the use of ethnic and national affiliations in everyday interactions by members of the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority, as a bridge across cultural differences and, occasionally, a source of differentiation and conflict. The study demonstrated that the nationalist rhetoric of Romanian and Hungarian elites is rarely reproduced in daily life, where more practical concerns dominate. Nationhood becomes salient in certain circumstances, to be sure, as when ethnic markers are acknowledged in microinteractions, when people are called to represent their community, or when they interact with ethnic and national institutions, but its unconditional importance should not be taken for granted.

Other studies have sought to elicit national frames of reference through in-depth interviews. Skey (2011), for instance, demonstrates the ease with which highly ritualized understandings of Britain are used to achieve a shared definition of a situation in social interaction. Even when they verge on clichés, such narratives help to establish common group membership [cf. Condor (2000) on ambivalence toward national talk in Britain]. This interactionist approach echoes Deutsch's (1953) argument that nationalism is reproduced through frequent interactions with linguistically and culturally similar individuals, and that such interactions may outweigh more infrequent contact with culturally distant others.

Skey's (2011) work also suggests that national identification grants people a level of ontological security (Giddens 1991) and that perceived threats to the nation's stability, like those represented by globalization and multiculturalism, can generate aggressive claims to the nation's cultural—and ethnic—purity, which are often expressed in everyday conversations. Such threats need not originate outside of the nation, however, as demonstrated by Miller-Idriss's (2009) study of differences in national attachment between German vocational school teachers and students. In contrast to the older generation that rejected nationalism because of its association with the country's Nazi past, the younger working-class respondents embrace the nation as a source of identity and solidarity. Because their national identification is explicitly delegitimized by the educational system, many of the students are drawn toward involvement in radical right-wing politics. The relevance and political implications of nationhood, therefore, depend not only on situational context and sociopolitical conditions, but also on the relationship between deeply held beliefs and dominant narratives embedded in national institutions.

These findings suggest that to understand which segments of a population are most receptive to nationalist political appeals, scholars would do well to focus on those who are acutely threatened by rapid cultural and economic changes. Moreover, such effects are likely to be mediated by

social class and cohort effects. These arguments are consistent with research on popular support for radical-right politics in Europe and the United States. In Western Europe, the working and lower-middle classes have benefited the least from European integration and have been the most susceptible to nativist rhetoric (Swank & Betz 2003). In the United States, the claims of grassroots conservative movements (McVeigh 2014) and right-wing presidential candidates (Knuckey & Kim 2015, Oliver & Rahn 2016, cf. Bonikowski & Gidron 2016) have strongly resonated with the economic insecurity and racial resentment of working-class white men.

Shifts in the salience of the nation are also driven by public rituals that heighten the national consciousness of large segments of the national population. Such rituals reinvigorate the nation by amplifying mutualistic norms and feelings of solidarity and by infusing group symbols with emotional potency and meaning [Collins 2012, Durkheim 1995 (1912)]. They include events that explicitly sacralize the nation, like civic holidays and anniversaries of founding moments (Skey 2006, Spillman 1997, Waldstreicher 1997), but also events that bring the national community together around seemingly nonnationalist ends, from sporting contests to democratic elections (Alexander 2006, Fox 2006, Hobsbawm 1983, Kertzer 1988). The result of these recurring rituals is the continual renewal of nationalism as a form of civil religion that places the nation above other collective affiliations (Bellah 1975).

Communities are especially likely to set aside internal differences and rally together during times of crisis that generate mutual entrainment around the national idea (Collins 2012), as illustrated by Americans' widespread public displays of national symbols after the 9/11 attacks (Skitka 2005). Such "rituals of solidarity" (Collins 2004) unfold in patterned stages, from a rapid initial surge, through a stable plateau of heightened emotion, to a gradual dissipation and return to pre-crisis levels. Given the fleeting nature of collective solidarity, the rituals' potent integrative effects are frequently preserved in symbolic representations, such as songs, poems, and commemorative monuments.

Whereas scholars in the Durkheimian tradition have stressed the integrative effects of national crises, the resulting upwellings of national identification can also engender otherwise unlikely policy developments. For instance, following the 9/11 attacks, Americans expressed unusually high levels of unconditional support for state institutions and leaders (Feinstein 2016a), which generated the conditions of possibility for the PATRIOT Act and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Chanley 2002, Kam & Kinder 2007). More recently, the moral panic in Europe and the United States concerning Syrian refugees has been exacerbated by nationalist politicians' exploitation of public fears following the November 2015 Paris attacks (Francis & O'Grady 2015), leading to the reintroduction of border controls in some Schengen Area countries.

Survey-based research supports these arguments, but it suggests possible mediating factors for the exclusionary consequences of strong identification with the nation. One such factor is the content of political discourse, as shown by Li & Brewer's (2004) study of reactions to the 9/11 attacks: Elite appeals for national unity increased public national identification, but the latter produced out-group hostility only when the appeals were framed in a culturally essentialist manner [cf. Solt (2011) on diversionary nationalism during periods of economic inequality]. This relationship is also likely to vary across countries, with more ascriptive citizenship regimes (Ariely 2012a) and norms of national membership (Pehrson et al. 2009) producing tighter coupling between attachment and xenophobia. Escandell & Ceobanu's (2010) study of Spain, on the other hand, suggests that in countries with strong separatist movements, national identification may be associated with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Similarly, Huddy & Khatib (2007) show that greater attachment to the United States is correlated with higher levels of political involvement (though it is conceivable that such involvement may give voice to exclusionary visions of the nation).

Research on banal nationalism has sought to identify mechanisms that contribute to the continued institutionalization of the nation. Practice-based approaches, studies of ritual, and survey research on national identification have added nuance to this perspective by demonstrating that most people employ national frames sporadically, in response to collective rituals and crises that heighten the nation's salience, but also in reaction to experiences of ontological insecurity shaped by social class, race, and gender. A greater salience of the nation in people's identity hierarchies can affect support for social exclusion and authoritarian politics, but this relationship is likely to vary across political and cultural contexts.

What these approaches do not directly confront, however, is what meanings the nation evokes when its salience increases. The nation as a symbolic, discursive, and cognitive category is not content-free: What matters is not just when and why people think and talk with the nation, but also what the nation signifies to them and their communities. By understanding the variety of meanings attached to the nation, we can begin illuminating nationalism's relationship to politics and inequality: how symbolic boundaries are drawn in daily life to the exclusion of particular categories of people, how popular beliefs about the nation's history and core principles affect the possibility for political change, and how views of the nation's role in the world shape policy preferences.

THE NATION AS A SITE OF SYMBOLIC STRUGGLE

Studying the nation as a meaningful entity inevitably raises broader questions about the role of culture in social life. In the context of Parsonian functionalism, which viewed culture as coherent and widely shared, the study of the nation's meaning involved the identification of the dominant values that defined the national community. The presumption was that those values would inform both popular beliefs and the practices of state institutions. In the case of the United States, for instance, the nation's character has been understood as embodying the principles of individualism, freedom, and political liberalism enshrined in the American Creed (Lipset 1990), as well as the norms of Anglo-Protestantism (Huntington 2004). In Germany, on the other hand, self-understanding has been arguably tied to ethnic lineage and fluency in German culture and language (Kohn 1944).

Research on national character had the virtue of bringing the study of meaning into nationalism research: It helped identify common tropes in nationalist discourse and produced a theoretical distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of national membership (the former is based on ascriptive and the latter on elective traits). Its major limitation, however, was its tendency to conflate categories of practice with categories of analysis (Brubaker & Cooper 2000, Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002). The principles of the American Creed have become ritualized in American political discourse, but this supposed consensus masks underlying cleavages in popular understandings of the nation; similarly, the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism is useful for understanding competing discourses and policy orientations, but when it is used to classify varieties of national political cultures, it fails to withstand theoretical and empirical scrutiny (Brubaker 2004a, Kaufmann 2000, Smith 1997, Yack 1999). More practically, characterizing countries as espousing distinct cultural norms may, at best, help explain country-level differences in political outcomes, but it cannot account for political conflicts within countries or temporal fluctuations in responses to nationalist discourse.

A more useful approach is to look explicitly for heterogeneity in public narratives concerning the nation's meaning. Traditional perceptions of the United States as an exemplar of civic nationalism have made it a useful historical case for this purpose. For instance, Smith's (1997) extensive analysis of US citizenship law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries revealed

three contrasting views of the country's symbolic boundaries: liberalism, republicanism, and ethnoculturalism. Rather than following a secular trend, the three traditions have oscillated in their influence, resulting in an internally inconsistent body of law that reflects elements of each tradition. Other studies have made similar claims about the historical multivocality of American political culture [e.g., Walzer (1990) on liberalism and republicanism, Lieven (2004) on liberalism and ethnoreligious nationalism, and Gerstle (2001) on civic and ethnoracial nationalism; for a more complete review, see Bonikowski (2008)]. This research demonstrates that the contemporary wave of nationalist politics in the United States and its resonance among large segments of the public represent a continuation of long-term historical patterns.

Essentialist conceptions of national character have also been challenged by research that examines episodes of public contention over representations of the nation's past. Given that public commemoration involves a wide range of constituencies, it often reveals conflicting beliefs about history—and the nation as a whole (Brubaker & Feischmidt 2002, Spillman 1997). This is exemplified by Wagner-Pacifi & Schwartz's (1991) work on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, which demonstrates the difficulty of sacralizing a morally ambiguous event. For some, the Vietnam War marked a valiant effort to resist Soviet imperialism, affirming the status of the United States as a beacon of freedom and enforcer of global order, whereas for others it served as evidence of gross geopolitical overreach, reinforcing the perception of the country as a morally questionable imperial power. Commemorating the loss of life in Vietnam in a way that satisfied both viewpoints required not only political negotiation but also modifications to the conventions of the memorial genre. When the costs of engaging in such interpretive struggles are seen as exceedingly high, traumatic events may be actively elided from national self-presentation (Rivera 2008) or forcibly incorporated into a consensus narrative (Teeger & Vinitzky-Seroussi 2007).

Zubrzycki's (2006) study of post-communist Poland extends this perspective by demonstrating that symbolic struggles not only reflect multiple conceptions of the nation but sometimes can also transform them. As competing factions bitterly fought over the placement of crosses near the site of the Auschwitz concentration camp, Poles actively rethought what it meant to live in a democracy and what relationship their country should forge with the Catholic Church and the rest of the world. Similarly, Bail (2015) has shown that the post-9/11 redefinition of American Muslims as threats to the nation's security and cultural identity was not an automatic reaction to the attacks, but the result of concerted efforts by radical social movements to alter public perceptions of Islam through strategic media campaigns. In the process, these movements brought previously extremist views into the mainstream of public debates, arguably shifting the boundaries of what it means to be a legitimate member of the American nation.

These studies bring us closer to the objective of mapping multiple competing understandings of the nation's meaning. They demonstrate that the nation's symbolic boundaries and rightful role in the world are sites of active contestation in the public sphere. For some scholars, these alternative conceptions represent a stable repertoire of competing narratives, which fluctuate in relative dominance and leave lasting imprints on policy and public consciousness. For others, these shared understandings are actively reshaped by social movements and radical political actors, who take advantage of public insecurities and protracted racial, ethnic, and religious animosities to mobilize support for their political projects.

Despite its considerable insights, however, much research on national identity privileges a top-down perspective that focuses on elite discursive conflicts and institutional practices of the state. It assumes that the competing accounts of the nation map onto the views of subsets of the national community, but it rarely investigates those popular sentiments directly [Brubaker & Feischmidt's (2002) and Bail's (2015) research is an exception]. To tackle the latter problem, I turn to survey-based attitudinal studies. Although limited in its ability to capture the full richness of cultural

meanings, survey research has the advantage of enabling distributional claims about competing perceptions of the nation within a given population.

MAPPING DISTINCT UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NATION

It is first worth considering how attitudes relate to cultural meanings. Tackling this question can help evaluate the results of survey-based nationalism research and guide scholars in designing more appropriate survey instruments and analytical strategies. One answer suggested by cognitive cultural sociology is that meanings are embedded in cognitive schemas: relational networks of domain-specific symbolic representations that enable the rapid processing of information on specific topics (DiMaggio 1997). Schemas are elements of individual cognition, but their content is shaped by socialization; in a sense, they can be thought of as the cognitive underpinnings of Bourdieusian habitus (Lizardo 2004). Thus, if we are to understand how people perceive the nation, we ought to capture the wide range of beliefs and symbolic representations that constitute people's nation schemas. These are likely to include tropes about the nation's character, salient national symbols and traditions, perceptions of the nation's appropriate symbolic boundaries, feelings of pride in the nation's heritage and its institutions, and views about the nation's relationship to the rest of the world.

Surveys should be well suited for measuring schematic understanding, because they contain large batteries of comparable items and, arguably, have the capability to tap tacit cognitive dispositions (Vaisey 2009). These features make possible inferences about the distribution of multiple understandings of the nation in a population and their potential translation into salient lines of cultural cleavage that shape the content of daily interactions and political preferences. In practice, however, survey researchers rarely analyze the full spectrum of nationalist beliefs in a relational framework; instead, they focus on specific subsets of nationalism measures and correlate them with political and social attitudes. Three such subsets are particularly relevant for understanding nationalism's importance in contemporary politics: legitimate criteria of national membership, national pride, and chauvinism.

Who Is a Legitimate Member of the Nation?

Consistent with challenges to essentialist studies of national character, survey research has documented extensive within-country heterogeneity in subjective definitions of the nation's social boundaries, thereby calling into question the association of ethnic or civic nationalism with particular national cultures. Shulman (2002), for instance, demonstrates that ethnic, civic, and cultural criteria of membership coexist in most countries, with minor cross-regional differences and considerable within-region heterogeneity [see also Ceobanu & Escandell (2008) on the convergence between Western and Eastern Europe]. Similarly, Jones & Smith (2001, p. 58) conclude that "distinctive discourses and policies on national identity, associated with specific religious, social, economic and historical trajectories, do not prevent people around the developed world [from] thinking about national belonging in very similar ways" [cf. Ariely (2013), who finds higher levels of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe and little evidence of cross-regional convergence over time, and Bail (2008), who identifies multiple configurations of symbolic boundaries across European countries]. These conclusions are consistent with qualitative studies of individual country cases that observe variation and ambiguity in respondents' conceptions of legitimate criteria of national membership (Brubaker et al. 2007, Miller-Idriss 2006, Skey 2011).

Establishing the existence of multiple conceptions of national membership criteria is crucial for understanding nationalism in settled times. It is also necessary, however, to consider how such

meanings shape social interaction and political behavior. An indirect way of addressing this is to examine associations between legitimate criteria of national membership and other social and political attitudes. Studies have shown that restrictive views of the nation (i.e., those based not only on elective but also ascriptive criteria, such as ancestry or birth in the country) are associated with stronger anti-immigrant attitudes (Kunovich 2009, Pehrson et al. 2009, Wright 2011a); negative sentiments toward ethnic minorities (Citrin et al. 1990); welfare chauvinism (Wright & Reeskens 2013); and cultural protectionism, including support for exclusionary language laws (Schildkraut 2003). These attitudinal outcomes are likely to have implications for the frequency and quality of social interaction across group boundaries, social movement mobilization, and support for exclusionary policies and extremist politics at the ballot box—though such causal effects have not been conclusively established in empirical research [but see Simonsen (2016a, 2016b)].

Scholars have also asked what predicts adherence to these alternative conceptions of the nation's symbolic boundaries. Those who place more restrictions on national membership tend to be older, less educated, and more religious; to earn less; and to belong to dominant ethnic groups (Hjerm 2001, Jones & Smith 2001, Kunovich 2009). Perceptions of group threat associated with rising immigration encourage more restrictive views (Wright 2011a), but this effect is muted when the out-group demonstrates allegiance to national symbols, as when immigrant protesters display the American flag (Wright & Citrin 2011). Cross-nationally, ethnocultural nationalism appears to vary negatively with economic development; exposure to cultural globalization, ethnic diversity, and democracy (Green et al. 2011, Jones & Smith 2001, Kunovich 2009; cf. Arieli 2012b); generous welfare state policies (Wright 2011b); and longer history of migration (Bail 2008). Conversely, exclusionary attitudes toward religious minorities appear to be positively associated with neo-liberal policy changes, particularly in Western Europe (Mijs et al. 2016).

What conclusions can we draw from this research? Studies of legitimate criteria of national membership demonstrate that there is considerable disagreement within countries about who counts as a legitimate member of the national community, and that more ascriptive views are associated with a range of exclusionary policy preferences. These beliefs appear to be shaped by sociodemographic factors and cross-national differences in political economy and citizenship regimes. What this work does not do, however, is account for temporal changes in collective definitions of the national community. As a starting point, future studies should track the changing salience of competing definitions of the nation's membership over time, in a survey-based analog to historical studies of public discourse (Smith 1997). As Wimmer (2013) persuasively argues, the symbolic boundedness of groups, including nations, is not stable but is actively shaped by institutional, interactional, and political processes. With sufficiently fine-grained data, survey research could explore these changing boundary configurations and generate insights into how these developments contribute to and are shaped by macro-level changes in political culture.

What Are the Nation's Virtues?

The mobilization of ethnocultural resentment in political discourse is not always explicit: Nationalist rhetoric just as often relies on ostensibly innocuous references to the nation's virtues, particularly when those virtues are perceived to be under threat. These mobilization efforts sometimes identify specific symbols of national heritage or particular principles and values as especially worthy of celebration and protection. To understand public support for such political appeals, research on nationalism must also consider variation in respondents' feelings of national pride.

Political psychologists have made inroads into this topic, but their progress has been impeded by a lack of conceptual clarity. This research tends to interpret survey measures of pride as indicative

of patriotism, an ostensibly benign emotional connection to the nation. Defined in this manner, patriotism has been shown to be associated with greater identification with the nation (Evans & Kelley 2002) and greater support for and compliance with state institutions (Gangl et al. 2015), but not with negative evaluations of out-groups (Blank & Schmidt 2003, De Figueiredo & Elkins 2003). The normative distinction between patriotism and more invidious forms of nationalism becomes conceptually problematic, however, when we consider conflicting findings from other studies in political psychology: Far from being universally prosocial, patriotism can in fact correlate with out-group hostility when the salience of group comparison is heightened (Mummendey et al. 2001) and the unity of the nation is emphasized (Li & Brewer 2004). High levels of national pride have also been associated with a social dominance orientation, ethnocentrism, and racism (Sidanius & Petrocik 2001, Sidanius et al. 1997), as well as with authoritarianism, support for the neutralization of political dissent, and greater perception of threat from minorities (Parker 2010, Schatz et al. 1999).

While it does appear that national pride may, in certain forms and under particular conditions, be unencumbered by associations with out-group hostility, scholars should exercise care in interpreting pride as a unitary phenomenon. Sidanius & Petrocik (2001), for instance, argue that the meaning of national pride depends on group status, and that pride takes on the form of exclusionary patriotism among ethnic majorities by fusing their communal and national identities. Others have shown that standard national pride measures capture two general domains of nationalist sentiment: pride in the nation's cultural heritage and pride in institutions (Ariely 2011, Bonikowski 2013, Hjerm 1998), with the former correlating with ethnocultural understandings and the latter with civic conceptions of national membership. Further complicating these distinctions, interview-based research suggests that surveys may underestimate more general "ambivalence, confusion, and contradiction" in respondents' feelings of pride and shame in the nation (Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg 2012, p. 133).

What Is the Nation's Place in the World?

If the literature on national pride is equivocal about the relationship between pride and out-group sentiments, the same cannot be said of studies focusing on feelings of national superiority. Various terms such as chauvinism (Li & Brewer 2004), generalized pride (Smith & Kim 2006), hubris (Bonikowski & DiMaggio 2016), or, by political psychologists, simply nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach 1989), these beliefs entail evaluative comparisons of one's own country with the rest of the world that result in the "denigration of the alternatives to the nation's institutions and principles" (De Figueiredo & Elkins 2003).

Studies have demonstrated a consistent positive association between chauvinist attitudes and support for bellicose foreign policy (Kosterman & Feshbach 1989), authoritarian attitudes (Blank & Schmidt 2003, Huddy & Khatib 2007), prejudice against minorities (Blank & Schmidt 2003), hostility toward immigrants (De Figueiredo & Elkins 2003, Knudsen 1997), opposition to supra-national institutions (Müller-Peters 1998), and voter apathy (Huddy & Khatib 2007). Some of these associations may become even stronger when the nation experiences external threats (Feinstein 2016b). Although analytically distinct from other dimensions of nationalist beliefs, chauvinism appears to be positively correlated with national pride (Huddy & Khatib 2007), national identification (Blank & Schmidt 2003), and unconditional support for the country (Schatz et al. 1999).

Finally, chauvinism is associated with individual-level and country-level predictors. Across a wide range of countries, respondents with lower levels of education, employed in manual occupations, born in older cohorts, and espousing greater levels of religiosity are more likely to view

their nation as superior to others (Coenders & Scheepers 2003). At the country level, the presence of nationalist parties and ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity appears to have no correlation with chauvinism, whereas recent experience of military conflict or transition to democracy is associated with its greater prevalence (Hjerm & Schanbel 2010).

In sum, survey research has made important contributions to the scholarly understanding of nationalism in settled times: It has challenged essentialist conceptions of unitary national character, demonstrated that attitudes toward the nation are multidimensional, and documented the relationship between specific components of national schemas and political dispositions. In so doing, it has offered a useful complement to qualitative research on the use of national frames of understanding in everyday practice. This research tradition has been limited, however, in its ability to connect these ideational components into overarching relational schemas of the nation, to systematically track variation in these belief structures within national communities and over time, and to examine the contextual factors that affect the relative salience of nationalist beliefs at particular historical junctures.

A WAY FORWARD

The study of nationalism in settled times is not a unified field, but the multiple research streams described here offer potential building blocks for a more complete understanding of how people think, talk, and act with the nation in everyday life—and how such beliefs shape support for authoritarian politics and exclusionary policies. This research demonstrates that the nation's taken-for-granted status is routinely reproduced through contact with institutions and material culture and exposure to micro-level interactions and public discourse. Viewed in this manner, the nation is both a stock of generalized knowledge that shapes common-sense understandings of reality and a cultural frame enacted by individuals in everyday practice (Bourdieu [1980] 1990, p. 53; Patterson 2014). To be sure, people do not rely on conscious national thinking all of the time; they do so only when the nation is made salient in interaction or in public discourse. Nevertheless, even when latent, the nation as a cognitive construct structures the contours of what is possible and desirable in subtle and unobtrusive ways.

The meanings attached to the nation are neither invariant nor stable over time. On the contrary, minor shifts in how the nation is represented in micro-level practices and public interpretive struggles are likely to aggregate into incremental changes in the nation's understanding in the broader population. These changes, in turn, have the potential to affect accepted norms of group interaction and discourse, as well as more formal institutional rules, including state policy. Moreover, some elements of national schemas are more closely linked than others to socially exclusionary attitudes and behaviors, but their impact can only be understood as conditional on their configurational relationship with other beliefs and on their contextual variation across status groups and countries and over time.

This tentative synthesis opens the possibility for asking a wide range of new research questions: How stable are conceptions of the nation within individuals and cultural communities? Do people shift across different schemas of the nation over time, and if so, under what circumstances? Are certain understandings of the nation particularly likely to be activated in moments of crisis? How long do such heightened sentiments last? Are dominant narratives concerning national identity understood differently by people who attach distinct meanings to the nation? How influential are elite interpretations of crisis events in shaping changes in national self-understanding? To what degree do conceptions of the nation resonate or cut across partisan ideologies? How important are differences in national schemas for shaping social network ties, and vice versa?

Answers to these and related questions will require scholars to engage with the multiple traditions outlined here by analyzing the nation's role in everyday practice while also examining variations in the nation's meanings, by studying public conflicts over the nation's past in a way that considers not only elite talk but also public attitudes, and by focusing on distributional patterns of nationalist beliefs without ignoring the relationality and contextual dependence of meaning. Because research on nationalism in settled times must engage lay understandings in a systematic and, ideally, inductive manner, it will also necessitate innovations in data collection and analysis.

To encourage future scholarship on the topic, I will point out a few specific opportunities for a more consciously cumulative study of nationalism-as-practice. Necessarily, this discussion will be both theoretical and methodological, because these two sets of concerns are particularly interconnected in cultural research (Mohr 1998).

Mapping Cultural Heterogeneity

Although the research reviewed here has begun to consider how conceptions of the nation vary within national populations, it has not generated a consistent typology of nationalist beliefs nor mapped it onto concrete communities of thought (Zerubavel 1997). To do so, scholars will need to overcome the limitations of the three dominant methods used to study the heterogeneity of the nation's meanings: eliciting interpretations from respondents in interviews or ethnographic fieldwork, observing articulations of meaning in public debates, and analyzing attitudinal variables in survey research. Interviews and fieldwork capture the subtlety of practice-oriented cognition but cannot produce distributional claims about the general prevalence of cultural schemas [moreover, they often rely on sampling based on nominal characteristics, which runs the risk of uncritically reifying groups (Brubaker & Cooper 2000)]. Content analysis of public discourse is able to identify common cultural patterns, but it cannot observe what is never articulated (Lukes 2005); it also privileges elite talk, which only bears partial resemblance to the beliefs of everyday people. Finally, surveys lend themselves to population-level inferences but suffer from reductive operationalizations of culture and, in practice, encourage the treatment of attitudes in isolation from one another, as variables with net effects in multivariate models.

What solutions are available? Setting aside the availability of alternative sources of data, to which I will return, one possibility is to rely on mixed-methods research that can simultaneously capture elite talk and lay attitudes or combine the inductive strengths of interviews with the representativeness of surveys. Another possibility is to rely on more sophisticated techniques for extracting meanings from survey items. A number of relational survey methods are well suited to identifying latent response patterns, mapping them onto respondents, and examining their prevalence in the population (Bollen & Díez Medrano 1998, Bonikowski 2013, Bonikowski & DiMaggio 2016, Goldberg 2011; for a review, see Mohr 1998). Even though such approaches do not eliminate the shortcomings of closed-ended responses, they represent a marked improvement over traditional variable-based analyses. In addition, they allow for the inductive identification of cultural patterns, without the need for a priori judgments about the boundedness of cultural groups.

Reconciling Multiple Nationalisms

Much research on nationalism in settled times focuses on individuals' dispositions toward their country of residence. Although this is reasonable for lifelong residents, it fails to take into account migratory experiences, which are common in contemporary globalized societies. To

assume that most people feel a sense of belonging to a single nation is itself a nationalist fallacy. Researchers should examine the practical use and schematic representation of the full range of national affiliations that are salient to research participants. Not only might such multiple nationalisms coexist, but they might also generate tensions and opportunities for those who hold them. Research on this topic should bring nationalism studies into productive dialogue with scholarship on migration and transnationalism, two literatures that have been surprisingly disconnected from nationalism research (but see Foner & Simon 2015, Lainer-Vos 2013, Levitt 2015). The resulting engagement across subfields may help identify additional factors influencing the content of national understandings, including the role of institutions in receiving countries, the interaction between multiple political cultures, the importance of local contexts of reception, and the role of generational change.

Moving Beyond Surveys

To return to the problem of measurement, much of the existing comparative survey research on nationalism relies on a handful of repeated cross-sectional data sets. This is understandable, given the difficulty of cross-national survey projects. As a result, however, researchers are limited to existing survey items, which capture only a subset of nationalist beliefs. When considered together with the infrequency of new waves of data, the decline in the quality of survey samples, and the fact that new surveys tend to reproduce existing questions in the interest of comparability, the future utility of surveys for nationalism research looks rather unoptimistic.

One reasonable solution is greater reliance on interviews and fieldwork, but for all their advantages, such methods are unsuitable for observing naturally occurring patterns of meaning across large numbers of people. A potentially promising alternative is to take advantage of the unprecedented volumes of digitized text produced through online interaction and routine institutional practices (Bail 2014). The advantages offered by such data are considerable: They capture meaning outside of an artificial research setting, rely on samples—and often populations—of thousands of observations, and allow for inductive analyses using fully or partially automated methods (DiMaggio et al. 2013, Bonikowski & Gidron 2016). New sources of textual data have the capability of bridging the divide between context-sensitive and distributionally oriented methods by simultaneously mapping communities of shared meaning, inductively tracking fluctuations in the salience of the nation, and examining the contextual predictors and sociopolitical consequences of the use of the nation as a category of practice. Although these methods are not without their limitations and their validation can be time-consuming (Grimmer & Stewart 2013), they hold considerable promise for the study of contemporary nationalism (e.g., Bail 2015).

Taking Emotions Seriously

Research on nationalism tends to privilege cognition over emotion. Whether studying nationalist talk or nationalist attitudes, scholars often focus on the prevalence and content of the nation as a symbolic construct. The nation, however, is also an emotionally laden phenomenon (Collins 2004, Berezin 1997, Rahn et al. 1996). This is obvious in the context of rituals, protests, and national crises, but it is no less true in the course of everyday practice. Psychologists have transcended the dichotomy between rational cognition and irrational affect, demonstrating that much routine behavior, including the moral classification of social groups, is guided first and foremost by viscerally felt emotions (Damasio 2003, DiMaggio 2001, Haidt 2012). Given that nationalism is inherently based on an exclusionary logic of group membership, concerns over moral classification and affective judgment should be central to the field. By systematically measuring and theorizing

emotions, scholars can gain a better understanding of the mechanisms that shape and activate national schemas. Doing so may open new possibilities for connecting nationalism as an ideology with nationalism as a mode of practice. Recent advances in sociological thinking about emotions in social movements and institutional politics demonstrate the promise of such an approach (Berezin 2001, Emirbayer & Goldberg 2005, Goodwin et al. 2000, Jasper 2011).

Linking Everyday Beliefs with Political Discourse

This review began with references to nationalist discourse in contemporary politics. Although the literature reviewed here offers insights into the possible sources of support for radical parties and candidates, the connection between political discourse and everyday nationalism remains under-theorized. Developing more systematic approaches to the study of nationalist beliefs is important, but this must be followed by an explicit focus on the dynamics of nationalist mobilization in both institutional politics and social movements, with media representations as a crucial intermediary mechanism. Such research can further scholarly understanding of how particular nationalist messages resonate with specific schemas of the nation (Snow & Benford 1988), how those schemas are themselves influenced by contestation in political fields (Bail 2015), and which segments of the population are the most susceptible to the politics of fear that often accompanies nationalist claims-making (McVeigh 2014). Because nationalist claims are often articulated in conjunction with and in opposition to other discursive strategies, such as populism (Oliver & Rahn 2016, Bonikowski & Gidron 2016) and welfare chauvinism (Mudde 1999), their study should be expressly relational, taking into account configurations of actors and claims within political fields (Bail 2015, Medvetz 2012, Mora 2014, Slez & Martin 2007). By taking seriously the relationship between beliefs and public discourse, nationalism research has the potential to better explain how everyday conceptions of the nation can occasionally fuel support for exclusionary policies, radical movements, and authoritarian politics in otherwise stable democratic polities.

Reconciling the uses of nationalist talk in everyday practice with survey data on nationalist attitudes and integrating both with rituals, commemoration, and political discourse is no small feat. But what may initially appear to be a set of intractable differences can also be viewed as a potential source of intellectual opportunities. If innovation is ultimately about creative recombination, then research on nationalism in settled times occupies a favorable structural position. Bringing together multiple literatures and taking advantage of new data and analytical methods carries the promise of substantially altering our understanding of nationalism and of integrating the resulting insights with other established areas of scholarship, from political claims-making and collective identification to immigration and globalization. The rich and innovative studies reviewed here have paved the way toward a more meaningful engagement with nationalism as a central feature of contemporary social and political life; it is up to future scholarship to elaborate their contributions into a systematic research program on nationalism in settled times.

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